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PRIVATIZING ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW WITH
ARBITRATION: THE TITLE VII PROOF PROBLEM
Stephen A. Plass*
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite compelling arguments by litigators, policy-makers,
and scholars that employees should not, as a condition of employ-
ment, be required to waive their statutory antidiscrimination fo-
rum rights in favor of arbitration, the United States Supreme
Court continues to support waiver.' The Court's latest decisions
reflect a complete turnaround, since the Supreme Court itself had
advocated against waiver in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.2
Opposition to waiving statutory forum guarantees is mainly
grounded in the belief that civil rights laws are unique and de-
serve particularized judicial attention to achieve congressional
goals. 3
No-waiver advocates argue, for example, that Title VII pro-
vides special congressional guarantees that unions and employers
* Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law.
1. David E. Feller, Putting Gilmer Where It Belongs: The FAA's Labor Exemption, 18
Hofstra Lab. & Empl. L.J. 253, 253-54 (2000) (arguing that almost everyone regards
mandatory arbitration as undesirable and unfair); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (holding that an employee could waive his statutory forum
rights unless he could prove that Congress intended those rights to be non-waivable);
Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998) (suggesting that a union can
waive an employee's statutory forum rights in a collective bargaining contract as long as
the waiver is clear and unmistakable).
2. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974). The Court ruled "there
can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights under Title VII." The Court added
that Title VII rights are statutory, not contractual, and waiver of such rights would defeat
important congressional policy and goals. Id.
3. Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential Per-
spective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer, 44
Hastings L.J. 1187, 1189 (1993) (there is a sentiment that public officers should enforce
public values); see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1017, 1019
(1996) (statutory rights are intended and designed to protect workers who can't protect
themselves); Patrick 0. Gudridge, Title VII Arbitration, 16 Berkeley J. Empl. & Lab. L.
209, 210 (1995) (arbitration permits employers to avoid statutory damages provisions);
Elizabeth A. Roma, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts and the Need
for Meaningful Judicial Review, 12 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Policy & L. 519, 531-41 (2004)
(arbitrators may lack legal training, yet they are called upon to decide legal issues, and
their decisions are essentially unreviewable).
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should be barred from waiving by contract. 4 Specifically, general
statutory rights-such as the right to jury trial, appellate review,
compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney fees-are gen-
erally unavailable in arbitration. 5
It is further argued that employees often lack bargaining
power or the ability to consent to waivers, thereby making waiver
agreements contractually deficient. 6 Even the presumption that
arbitration is quick, cheap and easy has been challenged. 7 And
implicit in the arguments against waiver is a judgment that em-
ployees can better realize their statutory guarantees through
traditional judicial processes.
Supporters of waiver and arbitration point to the difficulties
of obtaining a lawyer, difficulties in proving discrimination and
surviving appellate review," and the enforcement limitations of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).9 Fur-
ther, they note that there is not much chance of employer over-
4. Ronald Turner, Employment Discrimination, Labor and Employment Arbitration,
and the Case against Union Waiver of the Individual Worker's Statutory Right to a Judicial
Forum, 49 Emory L.J. 135, 200 (2000) (because unionized employees are not parties, but
merely beneficiaries of the collective bargaining contract, principles of contract law do not
support union waivers of statutory rights); see Van Wezel Stone, supra n. 3, at 1036 (waiver
agreements are contracts of adhesion because employees have no bargaining power). But
see Theodore J. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Law in Two Transitional Decades, 42
Brandeis L.J. 495, 523-24 (2004) [hereinafter St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Law]
(union waiver is less of an adhesion contract because unions have bargaining power).
5. Gudridge, supra n. 3, at 210 (arbitration allows employers to avoid compensatory
and punitive damages); Clyde W. Summers, Mandatory Arbitration: Privatizing Public
Rights, Compelling the Unwilling to Arbitrate, 6 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Empl. L. 685, 711-13, 717
(2004); see Malin & Ladenson, supra n. 3, at 1188 (employers like arbitration because it
helps them avoid costly statutory processes); see also Rebecca K. Beerling, Left Out of the
Balance-The Public's Need for Protection against Workplace Discrimination: Waffle House
and Kidder Peabody Attempt to Limit the Remedies Available to the EEOC by Balancing
Policies Not in Conflict, 25 Hamline L. Rev. 296, 299 (2000) (arguing that the deterrence
effect of public adjudication is lost in the arbitral forum).
6. Van Wezel Stone, supra n. 3, at 1036.
7. Summers, supra n. 5, at 718.
8. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination
Claims: Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise? 15 Thomas M. Cooley L. Rev. 1, 7 (1998)
[hereinafter St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration]; Michael Z. Green, Finding Lawyers for
Employees in Discrimination Disputes as a Critical Prescription for Unions to Embrace Ra-
cial Justice, 7 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Empl. L. 55, 66-67 (2004) (this argument recognizes that in
some cases one may have a legal right that is not beneficial to exercise). See also Edward
L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 478, 488 (1981) (sometimes
waiver is desirable because one may be better off forfeiting a right).
9. Vaseem S. Hadi, Ending the 180 Day Waiting Game: An Examination of the Court's
Duty to Short-Circuit the EEOC Backlog through the Power of Judicial Review, 27 U. Day-
ton L. Rev. 53, 87 (2001) (the EEOC is incapable of resolving the multitude of cases filed
every year); Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study of the Implemen-
tation of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
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reaching when unions execute waivers on behalf of their members
because unions are strong and experienced bargainers. 10 Waiver
supporters conclude that if the statutory remedial guarantees are
available in arbitration, employees may be better off than in
court. 11
This Article will examine the bona fides of the competing
claims for and against waiver. The Article's first part demon-
strates how Title VII lost its pedigree and concomitant judicial at-
tention over time. This part shows the Supreme Court's shift from
its liberal interpretation/employee-protectionist model that lim-
ited the role of non-judicial players such as arbitrators. This in-
terpretive shift, narrowing statutory guarantees, was part of the
foundation of waiver jurisprudence.
The second part shows that, as the Court limited its own abil-
ity to grant statutory protection and relief, it increasingly priori-
tized private contractual rights, which inured to the benefit of em-
ployers.
The third part looks at the effect of private contractual order-
ing, i.e., the proliferation of waiver agreements, 12 and shows that
arbitrators become contractually bound to apply the law of Title
VII. This means that arbitrators must use the judicially-created
proof structure that places heavy emphasis on direct evidence of
discrimination, 13 which is usually unavailable. 14 This part shows
that, like the judiciary, arbitrators give circumstantial proof of
mission, 50 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1, 106 (2001) (with its limited resources and changing priori-
ties, the EEOC cannot investigate and advocate at an effective level).
10. St. Antoine, Labor and Employment Law, supra n. 4, at 523-24; Rubin, supra n. 8,
at 489-90 (when the parties are evenly matched there is little chance of overreaching).
Contra Janet McEneaney, Arbitration of Statutory Claims in a Union Setting: History,
Controversy and a Simpler Solution, 15 Hofstra Lab. & Empl. L.J. 137, 158-60 (1997) (you
cannot entrust two majority entities-unions and employers-with the rights of minori-
ties). The Supreme Court expressed a similar sentiment in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (to permit waiver of Title VII rights is equivalent to allowing the
fox to guard the chickens).
11. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration, supra n. 8, at 2.
12. Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 2005) ("Indeed,
compulsory arbitration agreements are now common in the workplace, and it is not an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to require an employee to arbitrate, rather
than litigate, rights under various federal statutes, including employment-discrimination
statutes."), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2020 (2006).
13. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 514-15 (1993) (holding that employees
must provide direct evidence of employer's discriminatory motives). The Court held that
'nothing in law would permit us to substitute for the required finding that the employer's
action was the product of unlawful discrimination, the much different (and much lesser)
finding that the employer's explanation of its action was not believable." Id.
3
Plass: Privatizing Antidiscrimination Law
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 2007
154 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 68
bias little or no weight.15 As a result, employees arbitrating Title
VII cases lose at an alarming rate.16 And in cases when employ-
ees have prevailed, arbitrators have often found it necessary to
abandon Title VII's proof structure or rely heavily on circumstan-
tial evidence.' 7
The Article concludes that neither forum is advantageous to
employees as long as Title VII's proof structure governs. Even if
statutory guarantees-such as compensatory and punitive dam-
ages plus attorney fees-are preserved in waiver agreements,
these benefits remain elusive when an arbitrator is contractually
required to utilize stringent burden of proof requirements. The
real benefit of traditional labor arbitration is its informality and
the flexibility granted arbitrators to work with the contract and
around the law.' 8 Because arbitrators handle Title VII cases ex-
actly as judges would, proving intent continues to present a major
hurdle to discrimination victims. Requiring an employer to prove
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge is a far
lighter burden than requiring an employee to prove an employer's
discriminatory motivation. Until arbitrators appreciate the im-
14. In re VRN Intl. and Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 1978, 74 Lab. Arb. 806, 809
(1980) ("Where racial discrimination exists, it is an insidious evil, difficult to demonstrate,
and direct evidence is often virtually impossible to produce.") (citation omitted).
15. See infra nn. 86-87 and accompanying text.
16. See infra n. 87. Of course some losses are expected because, in some cases, employ-
ees may be mistaken about employer motivation, and in others, employees may abuse their
statutory rights. See David Sherwyn, Because It Takes Two: Why Post-Dispute Voluntary
Arbitration Programs Will Fail to Fix the Problems Associated with Employment Discrimi-
nation Law Adjudication, 24 Berkeley J. Empl. & Lab. L. 1, 17 (2003) (employees take
advantage of the many antidiscrimination laws by filing meritless claims); see also Ed-
wards v. Interboro Inst., 840 F. Supp. 222, 231 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
[Title VII] has, however, also unquestionably served to embolden disgruntled em-
ployees, who have been legitimately discharged because they were incompetent,
insubordinate, or dishonest, to file suits alleging that they have been the victims of
discrimination. The motives prompting those baseless filings may be inferred to
be harassment or intimidation with a view towards being rehired. Whatever the
motives, the frequency with which such cases are filed unduly burdens the federal
courts and subjects innocent employers to incredible expense which they cannot
recoup ....
Id. See also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 520-21 ("IThere is no justification for assuming... that
those employers whose evidence is disbelieved are perjurers and liars.... Undoubtedly
some employers (or at least their employees) will be lying."); Vargas v. Peltz, 901 F. Supp.
1572, 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (plaintiffs sexual harassment claim was based on a "litany of
lies").
17. See generally infra nn. 90-92 and accompanying text.
18. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596-97
(1960) (arbitral awards must be enforced as long as they draw their essence from the con-
tract).
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portance of circumstantial proof in Title VII cases, a survey of ar-
bitral awards shows that arbitrators will almost always credit em-
ployer explanations over an employee's circumstantial evidence of
discrimination.
II. TITLE VII Is No LONGER SPECIAL
Early in its history, Title VII was placed on a pedestal by the
Court. Concerned about the harms workplace bias had on blacks,
other minorities, and women, the Court pursued the statute's
goals of deterrence and compensation through liberal interpreta-
tions.19 The Court created disparate impact theory to combat
facially neutral practices that have discriminatory effects, 20 as-
signed great weight to circumstantial proof that an employer was
motivated by illicit considerations, 21 interpreted the statute to
permit affirmative action,22 and guaranteed statutory protection
by making the statute non-waivable. 23
By the late 1980s, the orientation of the law, national atti-
tudes towards Title VII, and the Court had changed. These
changes were reflected in Court decisions that equated antidis-
crimination mandates with ordinary torts. In 1989, the Court em-
barked on a campaign to reorient employment civil rights laws in
general and Title VII in particular. For example, in Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union,24 the Court limited the reach of U.S. Code
section 1981, a civil rights statute having roots in post civil war
black reconstruction. 25 The Court determined that a black woman
alleging employment discrimination could not ground her claim in
a statute prohibiting discrimination in the "making and enforce-
ment" of contracts. 26 Although section 1981 was an important
part of a national equal rights scheme providing for jury trials and
19. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (Title VII is remedial and
should be liberally construed); see Minna J. Kotkin, Public Remedies for Private Wrongs:
Rethinking the Title VII Back Pay Remedy, 41 Hastings L.J. 1301, 1304 (1990) ("In its first
round of statutory interpretation during the early 1970s, the Supreme Court made clear
that it would insist on a broad construction of Title VII.").
20. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
21. Tex. Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981).
22. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 (1979) (Title VII permits
voluntary affirmative action plans).
23. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
24. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171 (1989).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000).
26. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 171.
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more comprehensive damages than Title VII, the Court ruled that
the statute did not prohibit on-the-job discrimination. 27
Justice Brennan's response to this interpretation highlights
the degree of the Court's retreat. He wrote, "[wihen it comes to
deciding whether a civil rights statute should be construed to fur-
ther our Nation's commitment to the eradication of racial discrim-
ination, the Court adopts a formalistic method of interpretation
antithetical to Congress' vision of a society in which contractual
opportunities are equal."28
Further signals of retreat came from Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins.29 In Price Waterhouse, the Court ruled that "[c]onventional
rules of civil litigation generally apply in Title VII cases."30 The
application of conventional rules meant that employers who rely
on illegitimate considerations in making employment decisions
could meet their burden of proof responsibilities by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.3 1
Price Waterhouse dealt with the delicate and elusive issue of
employer motivation when illicit and legitimate factors go into an
employment decision. In Price Waterhouse, the Court prioritized
employer prerogatives and devalued the statute's general prohibi-
tion of sex discrimination. Although Title VII prohibits decision-
making grounded in an employee's sex, the Court concluded that,
in some instances, an employer can avoid liability even though it
considered and relied on this impermissible factor. 32 Rather than
elevate the employer's proof responsibility when sex played a role
in its decision, the Court treated the case as an ordinary civil law-
suit and rejected a more demanding "clear and convincing evi-
dence" proof responsibility for employers. 33
More evidence of Title VII's loss of pedigree came in Lorance
v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.34 In Lorance, the Court confronted the
issue of facially neutral policies that discriminate without the em-
ployee's awareness. In early interpretations of the statute, lower
courts were particularly sensitive to policies that blindsided em-
ployees. Instead of continuing the tradition of interpreting Title
27. Id. at 179 (the statute only prohibits pre-employment discrimination).
28. Id. at 189 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
30. Id. at 253.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 258 (employing the "same decision" test, i.e., that the employer's decision
would have been the same in the absence of prohibited conduct).
33. Id. at 253-54.
34. Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 903 (1989).
156 Vol. 68
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VII to allow employees to capture its protections, the Court ruled
that the employer's facially neutral, but discriminatory seniority
policy triggered the statute of limitations when it was adopted. 35
The Court focused on insulating employers from employees'
"stale" claims, instead of accommodating employee debility stem-
ming from lack of notice.36
This trend is also depicted in the Court's Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio decision.3 7 In Wards Cove, the Court confronted neu-
tral practices that produced a racially stratified workplace. In-
stead of buttressing the principles outlined in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,38 the Court essentially overruled Griggs by loading
proof responsibilities on employees and reducing proof responsibil-
ities on employers. 39 Although the disparate impact model was
designed to relieve employees of proof responsibilities, the Court
nonetheless added proof responsibilities by requiring employees to
identify all discriminatory practices and prove how they caused a
disparate impact. 40 At the same time, the Court reduced employ-
ers' proof responsibilities by imposing the light obligation to pro-
duce evidence of a business justification for the challenged prac-
tice.4 1 In the face of significant employee hurdles in challenging
facially neutral, but discriminatory practices, the Court deter-
mined that its "rule conform[ed] with the usual method for allocat-
ing persuasion and production burdens in the federal courts."42
Another decision relegating Title VII to the status of ordinary
torts is Martin v. Wilks,43 which elevated the status of reverse dis-
crimination suits through the use of basic civil procedure. 44 The
Court applied traditional procedural rules that give parties hostile
to consent decrees ample ammunition to undo settlements of dis-
crimination claims. Although in personam jurisdiction and
mandatory joinder procedural rules place heavy burdens on dis-
crimination plaintiffs, the Court held that the rules cannot be bent
or interpreted to accommodate voluntary efforts at settling dis-
crimination disputes. 45
35. Id. at 911.
36. Id.
37. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
38. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
39. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 656.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 659.
42. Id. at 659-60.
43. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
44. Id. at 761.
45. Id. at 761-68.
157
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The Court's elevation of procedural rules harmful to substan-
tive guarantees continued in the 1990s. The Court's decision in
St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks is illustrative. 46 In Hicks, a
black employee sued his employer contending that his discharge
violated Title VII.47 The employee established his prima facie
case and subsequently proved that his employer's defense was a
lie. Nonetheless, the Hicks Court ruled that he was not entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.48
Although it is well known that employees face great difficulty
in obtaining direct evidence of discriminatory motivation, the
Court undervalued circumstantial proof that would further Title
VII's goals. The Court determined that dishonest employers in Ti-
tle VII cases should be able to benefit from their lies the same way
they may benefit in other civil cases.49 In the case of Title VII, the
employer can use a lie to rebut the employee's prima facie case,
and stand on that lie to win, unless the employee can show the lie
was intended to cover up prohibited conduct. 50
The Hicks decision indicated that the Court's orientation had
not changed even after Title VII was expanded and strengthened
in 1991. 51 In Hicks, the Court continued its pre-1991 use of proce-
dural rules that operate as barriers to achieving the substantive
guarantees of the statute. In Hicks, the Court decided that evi-
dence of employer dishonesty must be handled in the same proce-
dural way as in any civil case.5 2 More troubling, however, was the
Court's failure to emphasize the negative inferences to be drawn
from such standards of proof.53 Instead, the Court focused on the
46. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 505 (1993).
47. Id. at 505.
48. Id. at 510-11.
49. Id. at 520-21. The Court found that
there is no justification for assuming ... that those employers whose evidence is
disbelieved are perjurers and liars ....
• . . But even if we could readily identify these perjurers, what an extraordi-
nary notion, that we "exempt them from responsibility for their lies" unless we
enter Title VII judgments for the plaintiffs! ...
... The books are full of procedural rules that place the perjurer (initially, at
least) in a better position than the truthful litigant who makes no response at all.
Id.
50. Id. at 510-11. The Court ruled that "nothing in [the] law would permit us to substi-
tute ... the employer's explanation [that] its action was not believable" for the "required
finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimination." Id. at
514-15.
51. Id. at 506. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
52. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-11.
53. See generally Stephen Plass, Truth: The Lost Virtue in Title VII Litigation, 29 Seton
Hall L. Rev. 599 (1998).
158 Vol. 68
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employee's responsibility to find mental-state evidence in an envi-
ronment where it is generally unavailable.5 4
Having switched from employee-friendly liberal interpreta-
tions to harmful conventional civil litigation rules, the Court has
now expanded its labor and employment jurisprudence by adopt-
ing common law contract rules as an effective regulatory device.
This move has placed employer and employee contractual free-
doms on a par with statutory rights, thereby giving the parties
great powers to privately order their antidiscrimination affairs.
III. REBIRTH OF THE PRIVATE CONTRACT
By 1991, when the Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/John-
son Lane Corp., 5 the Court had already built a substantial body
of case law treating Title VII like any other common law. Despite
congressional efforts strengthening and expanding Title VII in
1991, the Court's orientation did not change. The Court continues
to advance and extend a theory of employment law grounded in
private contractual freedom and reduced judicial protectionism. 56
In Gilmer, the Court was called upon to determine whether
an employee may waive his statutory forum rights granted by the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by agreeing to ar-
bitrate all claims arising out of the employment relationship.57
Instead of emphasizing the personal and special nature of statu-
tory civil rights and congressional preference that the judiciary
guard such rights, the Court focused on waiver's contractual na-
ture and employees' freedom to relinquish employment rights.58
The Court ruled that the ADEA's goals of deterrence and compen-
sation could be achieved in the arbitral forum, and the statute did
not need to be specially guarded by the courts. 59 On this basis, the
Court ruled that waiver must be judged, if challenged, by ordinary
54. Smoking gun evidence is generally unavailable in employment discrimination cases
because such discrimination is subtle and sophisticated. See Conn. v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
447 n. 8 (1982); see also Gen. Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 412 (1982) ("To-
day, although flagrant examples of intentional discrimination still exist, discrimination
more often occurs on a more sophisticated and subtle level . . .).
55. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
56. Discrimination today is often "sophisticated and subtle" so proving motivation re-
mains a daunting task. See Michael A. Zubrensky, Student Author, Despite the Smoke,
There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law after
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 959, 959 (1994).
57. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33.
58. Id. at 33.
59. Id. at 27-28.
159
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contract principles. 60 In that regard, a waiver should be knowing
and voluntary. 61
In Gilmer, the Court moved from emphasizing the procedural
and substantive guarantees of statutory civil rights laws to pro-
moting alternative options in arbitration as consistent with legis-
lative goals.62 Although employees do not get jury trials, appel-
late review, and statutory compensation guarantees when arbi-
trating, the Court concluded that it was the employee's
responsibility to show that Congress intended those rights to be
non-waivable. 63 The reality however, is that such proof is un-
available to employees because Congress's only pronouncement on
this issue arguably favors waiver. 64
Since Gilmer, the Court has expanded and strengthened the
foundation for contractual waivers and arbitral resolution of dis-
crimination disputes. In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corp., the Court suggested that a union could waive an employee's
statutory forum rights, provided that the collective bargaining
agreement had "clear and unmistakable" waiver language. 65 Sub-
sequent to Wright, the Court ruled that the Federal Arbitration
Act's (FAA) broad support for arbitration applies to employment
contracts, thereby adding statutory support to arbitral resolution
of employment disputes.66
In Wright, the Court confronted the issue of third party or
union waiver of employees' statutory judicial-forum rights. 67 Al-
though Gardner-Denver made it clear that waiver is not permit-
ted,68 Gilmer distinguished Gardner-Denver and held that waiver
60. Id. at 33 (holding Gilmer was bound to his arbitration agreement unless he could
cite contractual grounds for revocation of the agreement).
61. Id. at 29 n. 3. The Court also noted that issues such as fraud or unconscionability
can be reviewed on a case-by-case basis. In Gilmer there was no evidence that the waiver
agreement was the product of contractual wrongdoing by the employer. Id. at 33.
62. Id. at 25-27.
63. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
64. In 1991, Congress amended Title VII and added a provision for alternative dispute
resolution. That provision encourages the use of arbitration to resolve employment dis-
putes. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1081 (1991).
65. Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998) ("[W]hether or not
Gardner-Denver's seemingly absolute prohibition of union waiver of employees' federal fo-
rum rights survives Gilmer, Gardner-Denver at least stands for the proposition that the
right to a federal judicial forum is of sufficient importance to be protected against less-
than-explicit union waiver in a [collective bargaining agreement].")
66. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
67. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
68. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51-52 (1974) (holding that employ-
ees cannot prospectively waive Title VII rights because this would defeat congressional
intent).
160 Vol. 68
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is possible. 69 In Wright, the Court expanded the Gilmer principles
by suggesting that a union could waive employees' judicial-forum
rights. 70 The Court found that the arbitration clause in the collec-
tive bargaining contract did not incorporate antidiscrimination
law or address the relinquishment of statutory rights.71 However,
the Court concluded that nothing less than a clear and unmistaka-
ble waiver would satisfy the Gilmer holding.72 In effect, the Court
implicitly approved union waivers, or at least indicated that a
properly executed waiver provision would not be repugnant to the
goals of antidiscrimination laws. If unions can contractually
agree to final resolution of Title VII disputes in arbitration, this is
a significant departure from Gardner-Denver's declaration that
Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a congressional
command that each employee be free from discriminatory practices.
Of necessity, the rights conferred can form no part of the collective
bargaining process since waiver of these rights would defeat the
paramount congressional purpose behind Title VII. In these cir-
cumstances, an employee's rights under Title VII are not suscepti-
ble of prospective waiver.73
Two years after Wright, the Court virtually foreclosed an em-
ployee's chance to set aside an arbitral award or contractual
agreement on public policy grounds. 74 The Court ruled that in or-
der to vacate awards on public policy grounds, lower courts must
identify a public policy evidenced by laws and conclude that the
award itself, not the employee's conduct, violates such policy.7 5
This stringent test manifests strong support for freedom of con-
tract principles because it insulates the private bargain and
award from court review when an arbitrator decides what the pri-
vate contract means. In effect, an arbitrator deciding a grievance
stemming from discrimination misconduct could render an award
repugnant to Title VII, but consistent with the contract. 76 For ex-
69. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1991). The Court
found that Gardner-Denver addressed whether arbitration of a contractual right precluded
the litigation of the same right protected by statute, not whether an employee had con-
tracted to waive his statutory forum rights. Id.
70. Wright, 525 U.S. at 80-82 (holding that general contract clauses in a collective bar-
gaining agreement will not be sufficient to waive employee's statutory rights).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
74. E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57,
61-62 (2000).
75. Id. at 62-63.
76. See e.g. In re City of Boston and AFSCME, Loc. 804, 116 Lab. Arb. 906 (2001). In
this case an employee was discharged because he unfastened and grabbed a co-worker's
11
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ample, an arbitrator could reinstate an employee discharged for
sexual harassment because there is no explicit Title VII policy
that requires discharge or prohibits reinstatement of a sexual har-
asser.
77
Support for private bargains was further boosted in Circuit
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,78 thereby making statutory protection
against discrimination more susceptible to private ordering. After
a long avoidance, the Court in Circuit City decided the question
whether the FAA's pro-arbitration mandate was narrowly re-
served for commercial disputes. 79 Specifically, the Court ad-
dressed the FAA's exclusion of "contracts of employment of
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged
in foreign or interstate commerce."80 The Court settled on a nar-
row construction of this provision by limiting its reach to transpor-
tation workers.81 As a result, employers requiring mandatory ar-
bitration now have a national policy to support private ordering in
addition to the statutes and decisional precedents supporting arbi-
tration in the collective bargaining context.8 2
The Court's elevation of common law rules and deemphasis of
congressional prescriptions create a concern for the potential loss
of civil rights protection in employment. The prevailing sentiment
is that this jurisprudence robs employees of sacred statutory
rights.83 However, the loss of statutory protection is not as closely
tied to the change from judicial to arbitral forum as it is to the
arbitral forum's law.
IV. ARBITRATORS AND TITLE VII's PROOF STRUCTURE
A system of privatized adjudication in which arbitrators
strictly follow Title VII's proof structure appears to hold little
promise for employees. As one commentator noted, "most labor
bra, hung the bra on a van's mirror and teased her about it. The arbitrator found that
discharge was too severe a response because the collective bargaining agreement called for
progressive discipline as a general rule. Id. at 907-09.
77. See id. at 909. The arbitrator noted that there was no public policy which man-
dated the firing of an employee engaged in sexually harassing behavior. Id.
78. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
79. Id. at 112.
80. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 1).
81. Id. at 109.
82. See EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, & Scripps, 303 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Circuit City supports a conclusion that predispute agreements to arbitrate
Title VII claims are enforceable).
83. See supra nn. 4-7 and accompanying text.
Vol. 68
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arbitrators do resort to federal Title VII precedent in deciding the
employment discrimination claims presented to them."8 4 On the
specific issue of proving discrimination, arbitrators routinely uti-
lize the Title VII precedents outlining the proof responsibilities of
the parties.8 5 A review of twenty-nine arbitral awards reveals
that employees have particular difficulty proving employer dis-
crimination.8 6 Of the twenty-nine cases reviewed, twenty-two, or
84. Frank Elkouri & Edner Asper Elkouri, How Arbitration Works 123 (Alan M. Ruben
ed., 6th ed., BNA Books 2003). See also In re S. Cal. Gas Co. and Util. Workers Union of
Am., 91 Lab. Arb. 100, 104 (1988).
Although the authority of the Board of Arbitration is limited to the interpretation
and application of the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement, both parties have
cited external law to give meaning to Section 18.01 of the Agreement. It is there-
fore not only appropriate but necessary to consider applicable employment dis-
crimination law in this case; it is the apparent mutual intent of the parties that
the requirements of Section 18.01 be applied in a manner consistent with the pro-
visions of federal law.
Id. See also In re Mich. Dept. of Mental Health and Mich. St. Employees Assn., 82 Lab. Arb.
1311, 1315 (1984).
Some have taken the view that the arbitrator's sole function is to interpret the
terms of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Others have argued that the provi-
sions of [the contract] must be interpreted in accordance with applicable statutory
provision, including relevant judicial authority. In this instance, Article 25 refers
to "illegal discrimination" and therefore it is evident that the parties intended the
external law to apply.
Id.
85. E.g. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (setting out the
requirements for a prima facie case); Tex. Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 252-53 (1981) (detailing the three-step proof process which requires the employee
plaintiff to establish a prima facie case, the employer to produce a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason, and the employee to prove that the employer's reason is pretextual); St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (holding that showing employer's rea-
sons are false is not conclusive proof that employer was motivated by illicit considerations).
86. In re Vt. St. Colleges and Vt. St. Colleges Faculty Fedn., AFT Loc. 3180, 91 Lab. Arb.
1347 (1989); In re Reynolds Elec. & Engr. Co. and Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers ofAm., Loc. 631, 91 Lab. Arb. 1289 (1988); In re S. Cal. Gas Co. and Util. Workers
Union of Am., 91 Lab. Arb. 100 (1988); In re Heublein, Inc. and Individual Grievant, 84
Lab. Arb. 836 (1985); In re Mich. Dept. of Mental Health and Mich. St. Employees Assn., 82
Lab. Arb. 1311 (1984); In re Arb. between Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc. and Glass,
Molders, Pottery, Plastics & Allied Workers Intl. Union, 1998 WL 1033371 (CLC Arb. June
12, 1998); In re Arb. between Mid-Am. Energy Co. and Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc.
Union No. 109, 1997 WL 572913 (Arb. Mar. 31, 1997); In re Arb. between Loc. Union 160,
Intl. Bhd. of Elec. Workers and N. States Power Co., 1995 WL 735271 (Arb. July 19, 1995);
In re Henkel Corp. and United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 354, 104 Lab. Arb. 494
(1995); In re Aerojet Liquid Rocket Co. and Intl. Assn. of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
Loc. 946, 75 Lab. Arb. 255 (1980); In re Ga. P. Corp. and S. Council of Indus. Workers, Loc.
3181, 112 Lab. Arb. 317 (1999); In re Lawrence Berkeley Natl. Laboratory and Individual
Grievant, 108 Lab. Arb. 376 (1996); In re N.W. Publications, Inc. and Newsp. Guild of Twin
Cities Loc. 2, 104 Lab. Arb. 91 (1994); In re Chi. Transit Auth. and Amalgamated Transit
Union Loc. 308, 95 Lab. Arb. 753 (1990); In re Arb. between Foseco, Inc. and Intl. Assn. of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Dist. 54, 1993 WL 801341 (Arb. Feb. 11, 1993); Griev-
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76%, found no discrimination. 7 These arbitrators found no dis-
crimination because the complaining employees presented no di-
rect evidence that the employer was motivated by illicit considera-
tions.88 Further, arbitrators finding no discrimination gave little
or no weight to circumstantial evidence of bias.89
By contrast, the seven arbitrators who found discrimination
either abandoned Title VII's proof regime in favor of a more un-
structured formula, or relied heavily on circumstantial evidence. 90
With no direct evidence of discrimination, these arbitrators relied
heavily on inferences drawn from general comments or differen-
tial treatment to find that employers' decisions were motivated by
discrimination. 9' One arbitrator expressly addressed the direct
evidence problem stating, "[tihe courts have, therefore, permitted
an inferential method of establishing civil rights violations which
relies heavily on circumstantial evidence." 92
ances of C, 1992 WL 717410 (Arb. May 19, 1992); In re Arb. between U.S. Nuclear Reg.
Commn. and Natl. Treas. Employees Union, 1994 WL 853844 (Arb. Mar. 7, 1994); In re
United Parcel Serv. and Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters Loc. 554, 103 Lab. Arb. 1143 (1994); In re
Arb. between S and Los Alamos Natl. Laboratory, 1996 WL 915352 (Am. Arb. Assn. Dec. 16,
1996); In re Arb. between U. of Cincinnati and Am. Assn. of U. Profs., U. of Cincinnati
Chapter, 2002 WL 1767601 (Arb. May 22, 2002); In re Toledo Edison Co. and Intl. Bhd. of
Elec. Workers Loc. 245, 94 Lab. Arb. 905 (1990); In re City of Berkeley and Intl. Bhd. of Elec.
Workers Loc. 1245, 94 Lab. Arb. 1198 (1990); In re Weyerhauser Co., Okla. & Ark. Regions
and Intl. Woodworkers of Am., Loc. 5-15, 78 Lab. Arb. 1109 (1982); In re Farmers Union C.
Exch., Inc. and Intl. Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Loc. 975, 82
Lab. Arb. 799 (1984); In re S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. and S.F. Classroom Teachers Assn., 87
Lab. Arb. 750 (1986); In re City of Grand Rapids and AFSCME, Loc. 1061, 86 Lab. Arb. 819
(1986); In re Natl. Weather Serv. and Natl. Weather Serv. Employees Org., FCMS, 83 Lab.
Arb. 689 (1984); Grievance of Jean Lowell, 1992 WL 726291 at *15 (Vt. Lab. Rel. Bd. Aug.
20, 1992); Arb. between Intermountain Gas Co. and United Assoc. of Journeymen & Appren-
tices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Ind., 1996 WL 785388 (Am. Arb. Assoc. Aug. 29, 1996).
87. Supra n. 86 (first twenty-two cases).
88. Supra n. 86 (first twenty-two cases).
89. E.g. In re Lawrence Berkeley Natl. Laboratory, 108 Lab. Arb. at 380 (no weight
given to black employee's statistical proof that whites were paid more, that the company
had a history of discriminating against blacks, and that blacks were treated unfavorably
compared to whites); In re Ga. P. Corp., 112 Lab. Arb. at 319 (no weight given to black
employee's proof that the company implemented an anti-nepotism policy that resulted in
only black employees being fired, and that the company made an exception to policy for a
white employee); In re City of Berkeley, 94 Lab. Arb. at 1205 (despite having significant
concerns about a promoted junior white employee's qualifications, and having circumstan-
tial evidence of uneven treatment, arbitrator concluded that senior black employee did not
have sufficient proof of discriminatory motivation).
90. E.g. In re Weyerhauser Co., 78 Lab. Arb. 1109; In re Farmers Union C. Exch., 82
Lab. Arb. 799; In re S.F. Sch. Dist., 87 Lab. Arb. 750; In re City of Grand Rapids, 86 Lab.
Arb. 819.
91. Id.
92. In re City of Grand Rapids, 86 Lab. Arb. at 825.
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Employees alleging discrimination must establish a prima fa-
cie case.93 Then the burden shifts to the employer to produce evi-
dence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action. 94
Once an employer articulates a non-prohibited reason, the em-
ployee must prove pretext.95 To prove pretext, the employee must
first prove that the employer gave a false reason to mask a dis-
criminatory motive. 96 Merely proving that the employer's expla-
nation is dishonest is generally insufficient to prove pretext,97 but
discriminatory intent may be inferred from circumstantial evi-
dence such as an employer's false explanations. 98
The seven cases holding that discrimination occurred demon-
strate that when Title VII's proof structure is narrowly imple-
mented, the affected employees generally cannot meet their bur-
den of proof. The first example of this appears in the Weyerhauser
case.99 An employee was discharged for stealing company prop-
erty.100 The employee grieved the discharge and argued that it
was motivated by racial animus. 10'
The arbitrator found, without analysis, that the employee had
"made out a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of dis-
parate treatment and the Company [had] not advanced a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory basis for such treatment." 102 But applica-
tion of Title VII's three-step proof regime does not support such a
result. Even if the grievant established a prima facie case, the
employer met its burden to produce evidence of a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason when it produced credible evidence that the
grievant stole company property. 0 3 The company provided wit-
nesses to the theft, and the arbitrator found that "the Company's
93. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
94. Tex. Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
95. Id. at 256. The Burdine Court ruled that plaintiffs could win in one of two ways:
"either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unwor-
thy of credence." Id. at 256.
96. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993).
97. Id. at 524 ("That the employer's proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously
contrived, does not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason of race is cor-
rect.").
98. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000).
99. In re Weyerhauser Co., Okla. & Ark. Regions and Intl. Woodworkers of Am. S. States
Regl. Council, Loc. 5-15, 78 Lab. Arb. 1109 (1982).
100. Id. at 1110.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1112.
103. Id. at 1111. It appears that the grievant was also prosecuted and convicted for the
theft and the company also relied on this fact. Id. at 1114.
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assessment of the facts rings more true than that of the Union." 10 4
This meant that the prima facie case was rebutted and the griev-
ant now had the responsibility to prove pretext.
The grievant offered evidence of a prior incident in which
three white employees had set aside some company plywood,
which they undervalued in order to purchase later at a dis-
count. 10 5 For this theft the white employees were given a three-
day suspension, which was eventually expunged from their
records following a grievance hearing.10 6 The company distin-
guished the two cases by noting that nobody observed the white
employees committing the wrongful act, and the plywood never
left company property. In contrast, the grievant in the second in-
cident was observed stealing company property, and the stolen
property was taken off the premises.10 7 Company representatives
claimed that the plywood incident was at best "attempted theft,"
which was not prohibited by company rules, and the white em-
ployees were treated leniently because the union had insisted that
no theft occurred.' 08 If this company testimony is credited, then
no differential treatment occurred. However, even if the testi-
mony were discredited, it only constitutes limited circumstantial
proof of uneven treatment. The grievant would still retain the
burden of proving that the employer was motivated by race in dis-
charging him.
Finally, the union offered statistical evidence to show that
black employees were disproportionately charged with serious of-
fenses for which they were discharged. 10 9 The company chal-
lenged the statistics as unreliable because the sample was very
small and included offenses other than theft. 1 0 The arbitrator
found the company's interpretation of the statistics more persua-
sive than the union's."' In any event, even if the statistics were
reliable and compelling, they would only qualify as "circumstan-
tial evidence of discrimination." 1 2 Statistics alone would not es-
104. Id. at 1112.
105. In re Weyerhauser Co., 78 Lab. Arb. at 1110.
106. Id. at 1110-11.
107. Id. at 1111-12.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1111.
110. Id.
111. In re Weyerhauser Co., 78 Lab. Arb. at 1113 ("Here, both because of the small sam-
ple involved as well as the inclusion of a number of different offenses in an arguably selec-
tive fashion, I find the Company's position to be slightly more persuasive.").
112. E.g. Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979) ('Statistical evidence is
merely a form of circumstantial evidence from which an inference of discrimination may be
Vol. 68166
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tablish that the employer was motivated by racial concerns when
it discharged the grievant. 113
Boiled down to its essence, the proofs consisted of evidence of
theft, which was credited, and evidence of differential treatment,
which was unreliable. The grievant presented no direct evidence
that race motivated his discharge, and the circumstantial evi-
dence of uneven treatment was weak and unreliable. Such a re-
cord generally provides no basis for a finding of disparate treat-
ment under Title VII. Nonetheless, the arbitrator side-stepped
the issue by failing to evaluate the final two steps of a differential
treatment case: the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory rea-
son for discharging the grievant, and the grievant's proof of pre-
text.114
The second case finding that discrimination occurred, Farm-
ers Union Central Exchange," 5 also shows that an arbitrator
must avoid Title VII's proof structure in order to find discrimina-
tion. In that case, a black employee claimed that race motivated
his employer to rate him unqualified for a job he desired. 116 The
arbitrator did not mention Title VII's proof requirements until the
end of his decision." 7 And even then, he did not apply the three-
step process."" Here again, assuming the employee established a
prima facie case, the employer offered credible testimony and
work records showing that the employee could not do the job." 9
During a sixty-day trial period, the employee was observed and
evaluated by management officials, who determined that he was
unable to perform the job.' 20 Such proof easily qualifies as a legit-
imate nondiscriminatory reason for denying the employee the job.
The burden then shifted to the employee to prove pretext.
There was no direct evidence of discrimination, and no allegation
of racial bias during the job trial period.' 21 However, the union
drawn."); EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1264, 1285 (N.D. Il. 1986) ("Statis-
tics are an accepted form of circumstantial evidence of discrimination."); Gomolka v.
Quotesmith.com, 2005 WL 2614850 at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2005) (statistics as circumstan-
tial proof are rarely sufficient to prove discrimination).
113. In re Weyerhauser Co., 78 Lab. Arb. at 1113.
114. Id. at 1113-14.
115. In re Farmers Union C. Exch., Inc. and Intl. Bhd of Teamsters, Chauffers, Ware-
housemen & Helpers, Loc. 975, 82 Lab. Arb. 799 (1984).
116. Id. at 801.
117. Id. at 804.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 800-01.
120. Id.
121. In re Farmers Union C. Exch., 82 Lab. Arb. at 801.
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offered evidence that the grievant was the only black worker in
the bargaining unit, that his past job bids were ignored, and that
he was required to take a test to prove his qualification, a test
required of no other employee. 122 That the employee was black
and was not considered for other jobs were not by themselves pro-
bative of discrimination, but the allegation of differential treat-
ment was. The employer responded that the required test-which
the grievant refused to take-was a second opportunity to qualify
for the job after the grievant failed to perform during the trial pe-
riod. 123 The employer claimed that the test was a benefit to the
grievant, not a discriminatory act against him.
Without applying Title VII's three-step proof process, the ar-
bitrator found that the grievant was not objectively evaluated dur-
ing the trial period because there were no criteria by which his
performance was being judged. 124 The arbitrator found that sub-
jective supervisory evaluations were insufficient proof that the
grievant was evaluated fairly and impartially.125 The arbitrator
also found the test troubling because it was prepared specifically
for the grievant, was not validated, and had never been required
of other workers. 126
The arbitrator seems to have sensed that the employer was
not motivated by business concerns when it evaluated the griev-
ant and denied him the job.127 Because of this, the arbitrator
seemed willing to infer that discrimination precluded the advance-
ment of this minority employee, despite his minimal qualifica-
tions. The arbitrator ruled that "many of the actions of the Em-
ployer lacked a sound basis from which prudent judgments and
122. Id. at 801-02.
123. Id. at 800.
124. Id. at 803.
There has been no evidence presented to indicate what is expected of a mainte-
nance mechanic in the matter of performance.... The question then is asked
what was the standard for the grievant's evaluation as to his job performance
since there is or was no objective criteria used by the employer during the trial
period on which the Employer could form a justifiable or sound basis for its deci-
sion that he was not qualified to perform the work.
Id.
125. Id. at 804. There is no rule that requires an employer to use objective standards in
evaluating an employee's fitness, however. And the award does not indicate that the em-
ployer did evaluations any other way.
126. Id.
127. See In re Farmers Union C. Exch., 82 Lab. Arb. at 804 ("The decision and action of
the Employer also perpetuates a longstanding practice not to promote employees from
within the unit, including the grievant, who is a member of a minority group with a[t] least
minimal qualifications for the position.").
Vol. 68
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decisions could be made. From other facts and circumstances one
can only conclude the Employer's actions were racially motivated
"128
The third case finding discrimination is a sex discrimination
case involving the San Francisco Unified School District. 129 In
this case, the grievant-a pregnant teacher-was not recom-
mended for a position because her employer claimed that a sub-
stantial leave of absence would negatively affect the academic and
emotional needs of pre-kindergarten children. 130 The arbitrator
determined that the grievant was denied the job because of her
pregnancy. 131 However, the arbitrator then determined that it
was unnecessary to evaluate the case under the disparate treat-
ment theory or the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
defense.' 32 The arbitrator found that a policy denying employ-
ment opportunity because of an employee's future need for mater-
nity leave was discrimination per se, and more specifically, dispa-
rate-impact discrimination. 33
The employer argued that there was no disparate treatment
because its policy denied opportunities to all employees requiring
substantial leaves. 34 And in any event, only women were seeking
the job. 135 The arbitrator concluded that "even without consider-
ing whether some less discriminatory alternative policy might be
available, it is found that the District did not prove a business
necessity for its discrimination." 136
To find a disparate impact, one typically needs a facially neu-
tral policy which adversely affects a protected class of employ-
ees. 137 If the employee makes a prima facie case of adverse im-
pact, the employer has the burden of proving business neces-
sity.' 38 If the employer meets its burden, the employee must then
128. Id. at 805.
129. In re S.F. Unified Sch. Dist. and S.F. Classroom Teachers Assn., 87 Lab. Arb. 750
(1986).
130. Id. at 751.
131. Id. at 753.
132. Id. at 753-54.
133. Id. at 753.
134. Id. at 752.
135. In re S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 87 Lab. Arb. at 752.
136. Id. at 754.
137. E.g. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971).
138. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000) (amending Title VII and
codifying Griggs's business necessity standard).
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show that less discriminatory, equally effective alternatives were
available. 139
In San Francisco Unified School District, the employer had a
policy of not appointing anyone for the pre-kindergarten job who
planned a substantial leave of absence soon after school
started.140 The policy was facially neutral because it appeared to
affect both men and women equally. Therefore, the grievant had
to show that the policy had a disparate effect on pregnant women.
The grievant presented no such evidence. 141 The grievant pro-
vided no historical or statistical evidence to show disparate effect,
because the two individuals considered for the position in question
were both women. 142 Further, there was no evidence that men
who planned substantial leaves were treated any differently.
Despite the absence of evidence proving disparate impact, the
arbitrator ruled that the employer failed to prove business neces-
sity.143 The arbitrator cited cases holding that in a disparate im-
pact case, the employer's reason must be compelling and effective
to carry out its business purpose.'4 In this regard, the arbitrator
found that "there is no evidence that totally regular attendance is
required for a pre-kindergarten teacher to perform safely and effi-
ciently." 45 The arbitrator concluded that it was not necessary to
consider whether there was an effective, less discriminatory alter-
native because the employer's "educational purpose [was not] suf-
ficiently compelling to override the discrimination caused by the
policy."' 46
The fourth case evaluated involved the City of Grand
Rapids. 47 In City of Grand Rapids, a female employee alleged
sexual discrimination when her employer concluded she failed her
probationary try-out for a promotion. 48 The arbitrator applied
Title VII's three-step process and found no direct evidence of dis-
crimination. 149 Although the grievant made a prima facie case,
the employer articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
139. Id.
140. In re S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 87 Lab. Arb. at 752.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 754.
144. Id. at 753.
145. Id. at 754.
146. In re S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 87 Lab. Arb. at 754.
147. In re City of Grand Rapids and AFSCME, Loc. 1061, 86 Lab. Arb. 819 (1986).
148. Id. at 820.
149. Id. at 826.
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for denying the grievant a promotion because the grievant ac-
knowledged that she made mistakes on the job. 150 Therefore, the
burden shifted back to the grievant to prove the employer's stated
reasons were merely a pretext. On the issue of pretext, the griev-
ant presented evidence of one supervisor's sexist comments, evi-
dence that a male employee was not rigorously scrutinized, and
evidence that the employer failed to promptly provide the grievant
with an explanation of her mistakes. 15'
The arbitrator concluded that the grievant's evidence created
suspicion, but was insufficient to establish pretext, and therefore
discrimination, under Title VII.152 However, the arbitrator also
concluded that the grievant's proof was sufficient to establish that
the employer violated a contractual provision promising equal em-
ployment opportunities.1 53 Since one of the grievant's evaluators
made sexist comments, and the employer learned of this when the
grievance was filed, the arbitrator ruled that the employer had a
responsibility to investigate the comments before finalizing its de-
cision that the grievant failed her probation.154 The arbitrator
concluded that the employer violated the contract "because it did
not take any reasonable steps to insure that the decision to fail the
grievant on probation was not 'tainted' by discrimination."155
The additional three cases further confirm the importance of
working around the law and giving more weight to circumstantial
proof. In these three cases in which arbitrators found sex discrim-
ination, they relied heavily on evidence that the employers were
relying on negative stereotypes of women when awarding opportu-
nities. For example, in National Weather Service, the arbitrator
ruled that a generalized assumption that pregnant employees
could not do a particular job constituted disparate treatment. 5 6
In Grievance of Jean Lowell, the arbitrator found that the em-
ployer committed sex-stereotyping by "questioning the ability of
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. In re City of Grand Rapids, 86 Lab. Arb. at 826. The employment contract provides:
"Management and the Union acknowledge their continuing responsibility to carry on equal
employment practices whereby all employees will be given equal opportunity to be em-
ployed in positions which provide the greatest opportunity for use of their abilities." Id.
154. Id. The arbitrator interpreted the contract clause as requiring the employer "to
take reasonable steps to insure that employees on promotional probation are given a fair
opportunity to succeed regardless of sex." Id.
155. Id. at 827.
156. In re Natl. Weather Serv. and Natl. Weather Serv. Employees Org., 83 Lab. Arb. 689,
701 (1984).
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female employees to independently engage in complex intellectual
and investigative work."15 7 The arbitrator ruled that the em-
ployer's failure to similarly question men's abilities proved that
the employer's explanation was pretextual, and also proved dis-
criminatory motivation. 158 And finally in Intermountain Gas Co.,
the arbitrator found discriminatory intent because cleaning tasks
were assigned to a female employee but not to similarly situated
males.15 9 The arbitrator found proof of discriminatory intent in a
comment that the employee spent too much time with her family,
and the employer's unpersuasive explanations for its decision.
160
A. Judicial Direction on Circumstantial Proof
Two recent decisions show that the United States Supreme
Court has been warming up to the notion that judges can read
between the lines to find discrimination. In Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc.,161 the Court retreated from its tough
stance in Hicks that proof of employer dishonesty is generally in-
sufficient to prove intentional discrimination.1 62 Instead of af-
firming its position in Hicks that liars may routinely benefit from
the rules of evidence in civil litigation,1 63 the Court emphasized
that employer dishonesty about a material fact is affirmative evi-
dence of guilt.' 64 The Court held that when an employee elimi-
nates all legitimate reasons offered by an employer, or proves
them false, a court can assume that discrimination was the real
reason for the adverse employment action. 165 The Court thereby
gave an employee's circumstantial proof great probative value
when attempting to prove intentional discrimination.
Similarly, in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,'66 the Court
deployed conventional rules of civil litigation to help conclude that
a Title VII plaintiff can meet her burden of proof in a mixed-mo-
157. Grievance of Jean Lowell, 1992 WL 726291 at *15 (Vt. Lab. Rel. Bd. Aug. 20, 1992).
158. Id. at *16.
159. Arb. between Intermountain Gas Co. and United Assoc. of Journeymen & Appren-
tices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Ind., 1996 WL 785388 at *11 (Am. Arb. Assoc. Aug. 29,
1996).
160. Id. at **11-12.
161. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-49 (2000).
162. Id.
163. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993).
164. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
165. Id.
166. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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tive case by relying solely on circumstantial evidence. 167 In Costa,
the plaintiff offered proof that
(1) she was singled out for "intense stalking" by one of her supervi-
sors, (2) she received harsher discipline than men for the same con-
duct, (3) she was treated less favorably than men in the assignment
of overtime, and (4) supervisors repeatedly "stacked" her discipli-
nary record and "frequently used or tolerated" sex-based slurs
against her.168
The Court rejected the employer's contention that the Court's
Price Waterhouse decision required plaintiffs to prove mixed-mo-
tives by direct evidence. 169  Without addressing the Price
Waterhouse holding, the Court determined that nothing in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 commanded such a result. 170 The 1991
Act provides that a plaintiff must demonstrate that his or her em-
ployer considered and relied on an illegitimate factor, but does not
impose a special evidentiary obligation on employee plaintiffs. 171
Since the statute is silent as to what evidence is required, the
Court held that judges should default to conventional rules of civil
litigation, which treat direct and circumstantial proof equally.
The Court held that giving circumstantial evidence equal weight
is a "clear and deep-rooted" tradition in both civil and criminal
litigation.172
The Court's more positive outlook on circumstantial proof is
an encouraging sign, even though the employee still shoulders the
responsibility of proving the employer's intent. In addition, lower
courts are also recognizing that discrimination can be found even
without direct evidence in the record. 173 In the area of employ-
ment discrimination, arbitrators can satisfy the requirements of
the law and still render fair awards, but only if circumstantial
proof is given great weight. Arbitrators must now catch up with
the law that permits them to do this.
167. Id. at 99.
168. Id. at 96.
169. Id. at 93-94.
170. Id. at 98-99.
171. Id. at 100-01.
172. Costa, 539 U.S. at 100-01.
173. E.g. Davis v. Wis. Dept. of Corrects., 445 F.3d 971, 976 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding there
was sufficient proof of intentional discrimination even though the record contained no di-
rect evidence and was controverted).
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V. CONCLUSION
The right of employers to demand private arbitration as the
mechanism to resolve their discrimination disputes is solidly in
place. Increasingly, judicial involvement will be limited to enforc-
ing private contractual terms, even when those terms do not
mimic statutory mandates. To the extent that waiver agreements
impose Title VII's proof requirements, or are interpreted to incor-
porate them, employees face the same proof hurdles they would
otherwise encounter in court. The recent Supreme Court shift to-
wards increasing the weight of circumstantial evidence holds
great promise for discrimination victims arbitrating their cases.
However, arbitrators must embrace the reality that proving dis-
crimination, which is often complex and subtle, will require in-
creasing reliance on circumstantial evidence.
24
Montana Law Review, Vol. 68 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol68/iss1/7
